Observers saw an event in which a computer-animated square moved up to and made contact with another, which after a short delay moved oV, its motion appearing to be caused by launch by the Wrst square. Observers chose whether the second (launched) square was faster in this causal event than when presented following a long delay (non-causal event). The speed of the second object in causal events was overestimated for a wide range of speeds of the Wrst object (launcher), but accurately assessed in non-causal events. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that overestimation occurred also in other causal displays in which the trajectories were overlapping, successive, spatially separated or inverted but did not occurred with consecutive speeds that did not produce causal percepts. We also found that if the Wrst object in a causal event was faster, then Weber's law holds and overestimation of the launched object speed was proportional to the speed of the launcher. In contrast, if the second object was faster, overestimation was constant, i.e. independent of the launcher. We propose that the particular speed integration of causal display results in overestimation and that the way overestimation depends on V1 phenomenally aVects the attribution of the source of V2 motion: either in V1 (in launching) or in V2 (in triggering).
Introduction
Perceptual causality is a striking and commonplace illusory phenomenon occurring when temporal contingency continuously relates two independent objects that are spatially contiguous. Michotte, in his book The perception of causality (1946/1963) , Wrst observed perceptual causality in vision between two objects moving sequentially at speeds V1 and V2.
If V1 > V2, the Wrst object appears to cause a launch of the second, whose motion appears passive and mechanical (Fig. 1a) . However, if V1 < V2, the second object seems triggered by the arrival of the Wrst, its motion seeming autonomous (Fig. 1b) though still caused by V1. In triggering, the motion of the second object is generally described as active and autonomous (see Michotte, VII, 4) (Fig. 2) , though still involving mechanical agency. In this sense it should be distinguished from other causality phenomena producing the perception of animated motion, which involves biological animacy. In both launching and triggering, observers spontaneously describe the movement of the two geometrical objects to be related in terms of cause and eVect.
Michotte argued that the relationship of causality in the launching event is directly perceived, without the mediation of high-level processes. Also recently it has been argued that the perception of causality conforms to a modular, encapsulated process (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) . This view Wnds support in the demonstration of the independence of causal perceptions from causal judgments (Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992) as well as the Wnding that perceived causality is present in infants (Cohen, Amsel, Redford, & Casasola, 1998; Leslie, 1982; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes, 1994; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Schlottmann, Surian, & Hesketh, 2000) and children (Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth, & Hesketh, 2002) . However, several authors have cast light on the role of high-level components in the phenomenon (Hubbard, Blessum, & Ruppel, 2001; Kruschke & Fragassi, 1996; Schlottmann, 2000; Weir, 1978; White, 1995) . We agree that these are crucial in understanding the phenomenon, since they suggest that the visual system is capable of extracting implicitly high-level percepts such as the causal and social structure of the world from simple events, an ability of indubitable ecological value (Costall, 1991) . The classical demonstration of Heider and Simmel (1944) is striking in this respect. It showed that observers spontaneously describe spatio-temporal contingencies as social behaviour: moving geometrical shapes are perceived as being alive and even as having goals and intentional purposes.
Overall, studies of causality phenomena support an interpretation of perceived causality as lying at the intersection between perception and cognition (Scholl & Nakayama, 2002; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) , although the underlying mechanism remains unknown. If, as Michotte suggested, a low-level component exists, important questions can be considered: for example, do diVerences in perceived causality relate to diVerences in low-level motion judgments? In particular, do diVerences in mechanical causality and triggering relate to perceptual diVerences in perceived motion?
In addressing these questions, we focused on the relationship between causality and perceived speed. Indeed, since two speeds are presented consecutively after a short interval they could be perceptually integrated, so that the judgment of one speed could be aVected by the other. If they were integrated, the way could be diVerent for diVerent causal events such as mechanical causality and triggering.
Many studies, mostly using global motion patterns, have investigated the ways in which the motion system can integrate motion signals. From this work, it has been shown that integration of local velocities occurs by averaging across local speeds (Curran & Braddick, 2000; Khuu & Badcock, 2002; Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992) , by vector sum (Wilson, Ferrera, & Yo, 1992) , or by co-operativity of motion (van Doorn & Koenderink, 1984; Snowden & Braddick, 1989) . Averaging of local speed signals occurs independently of direction (Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992) and results in a global speed estimate, but occurs only within and not across speed integration mechanisms (Khuu & Badcock, 2002) . Integration of local velocities may also occur by vector sum. However, Curran and Braddick (2000) demonstrated that perceived speed of global dot motion was consistent with vector average and not vector sum, while Wilson et al. (1992) demonstrated that vector sum is more likely to account for global motion direction rather than speed integration. Motion integration may also occur on the basis of co-operativity of motion signals, but this phenomenon aVects motion direction not speed (Chang & Julesz, 1984; Snowden & Braddick, 1989; Vreven & Verghese, 2002; Watamaniuk, McKee, & Grzywacz, 1995) .
If in a causal display V1 and V2 were integrated, diVerentiation between the two speeds may prove diYcult. Against this hypothesis there are data in the literature showing that the visual system can diVerentiate local velocity with very high precision, with many (Casco, Grieco, Giora, & Martinelli, 2006 ), two (McKee, 1981 and one speed (Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992) . However, other data demonstrate a segregation diYculty, since the two opposite perceptual eVects -integration and diVerentiation -often account for the Wnal percept. For example in the motion contrast or induced motion phenomenon, apparent velocity of a target depends strongly on its velocity in relation to its immediate surround (Loomis & Nakayama, 1973) . Other studies have shown that discriminating speed changes is hard (Gottsdanker, 1956; McKee & Nakayama, 1984; Snowden & Braddick, 1991; MateeV et al., 2000) and Weber fraction is several times higher than speed discrimination for spatially and temporally separated stimuli. These Fig. 1 . Schematic illustrations of launching and triggering stimuli conWgurations. The arrows length is proportional to the speed. S1 moves in a straight line and stops when it reaches S2, which moves oV along the same trajectory. When the speed of S2 (V2) is faster than that of S1 (V1), S1 appears to cause or "launch" the motion of S2 (a). If V2 is larger than V1, then S2 seems triggered by the arrival of S1 (b). The duration of the pause at the contact allows (40 ms) or disrupts (1040 ms) any causal impression. Dynamic demonstrations are available online at http://vision.psy.unipd.it/.
authors (Gottsdanker, 1956; Nakayama, 1985; Snowden & Braddick, 1991) suggest that this result reXected averaging or integration of speeds. Verghese and McKee (2006) demonstrated that the spatial layout is important in speed discrimination. The neural bases of integration and diVerentiation are well known. They could be mediated by mechanisms of both early level (where lateral interactions between neurons underlying local speed estimation may occur) and intermediate level (V3, V5 or MT, V6 or MST) (Adelson & Movshon, 1982; Simoncelli & Heeger, 1998; Wilson et al., 1992; Yuille & Grzywacz, 1988) .
Since causality phenomena occur with presentation of consecutive objects moving along a single trajectory (Michotte, 1946 (Michotte, /1963 and depend on the relative speeds, one can predict that, as a consequence of speed averaging or diVerentiation, causality displays can give rise to speed misperception. Interestingly, while averaging of V1 and V2 has not been tested with perceptual causality displays before, averaging as a mechanism for integration of various causality cues (temporal and spatial contiguity, speed ratio) is suggested by the work of Schlottmann and Anderson (1993) .
The kind of speed misperception that can be originated by causality displays can be predicted on the basis of phenomenal reports, commonly described as qualitative changes of the kinematics of the second moving object due to the Wrst. Michotte clearly described the causality phenomenon as a causal relationship in one direction only: that is, V1 causes V2. This lead us to ask, if misperception occurred, whether the speed of the second object was aVected by the Wrst. We predicted that diYculty in correct judgment of V2 would be observed as a consequence of integration between V1 and V2.
Our main goal in all experiments was to isolate a possible speed misperception, speciWc to causal displays. In particular, we asked whether, in these displays, V2 was correctly perceived or else depended on V1. Furthermore, since causality phenomena depend on the relative speed as well as on other spatio-temporal parameters, we sought to establish whether diVerent causality events were associated with diVerences in the perception of V2. Finally, we sought, in Experiment 1, a possible psychophysical law describing perceived V2 in causal events.
In the current study, observers viewed the classical Michotte conWguration (pair of squares): the Wrst square moved until it made contact with the second. The second then started to move along the same trajectory while the Wrst remained still (see Fig. 1 caption) . In this causal event, the interval between the two movements was very short and should produce impression of causality. Observers were asked to compare the speed of the second square in this event with the speed of a second square in a subsequently shown event that involved long interval between the two motions, which should not produce a causal impression.
Our novel Wnding was that speciWcally for the causality displays, misperception of V2 resulted in an overestimation. Overestimation was not found with displays that did not produce causal impression. Moreover, overestimation was qualitatively diVerent in mechanical causality, where it was proportional to V1, and in triggering, where it was constant, a dissociation that could account for diVerences in the phenomenal description of the two events.
General method
The stimuli ( Fig. 1) were generated using True Basic 2.7 with an Apple Power PC-G3/333 MHz I-Mac and presented on a monitor of 1024 £ 748 pixels resolution at 57 cm viewing distance. One pair of squares (S1 and S2) with 0.5° side were aligned horizontally (except in one condition) and presented on a white background, at 2.5° from the centre of the screen, without Wxation mark. Squares and background luminance were 2 and 32 cd/m 2 , respectively. The spatio-temporal conWguration was such that the Wrst square moved towards the second with constant speed on a straight path for 2.8°; when the Wrst square contacted the second it stopped; the second then moved oV to the right for 2.8° on a straight path, while the Wrst remained still. This causal pair had a short interval between movements (40 ms) and produced the Michotte phenomena of (a) launching or (b) triggering, depending on V1. In a temporal two-interval forced-choice paradigm the causal and the "probe" pair of squares were presented randomly in the two intervals, symmetrically along the horizontal axis of the screen. The interval between the two events was 700 ms.
By pressing one of two alternative keys, observers compared the speed of S2 in the causal pair (V2 causal ) with that of S2 in the second pair (V2 probe ), where the interval between S1 and S2 was 1040 ms, to indicate which of the two was faster. V1 probe was equal to V1 causal .
Three experiments were carried out. In the Wrst experiment we measured how perceived V2 depended on V1 for diVerent levels of V1 in both launching and triggering. In Experiment 2, we tested perceived V2 in other causal conWgurations producing mechanical launching. In Experiment 3, we aimed at assessing whether misperception of V2 was speciWc to perception of causality.
V2 probe varied, either lower or higher than V2 causal (3°/s) at seven levels, randomly in a block: 3 § 1.2, .8, .4, 0°/s. V1 was constant in a block. We measured the probability of perceiving V2 in the causal conWguration faster than V2 in the probe. Observers viewed the display binocularly and were free to track. Using the method of constant stimuli, a block of trials randomly presented consisted of 10 repetitions of each V2 probe level. Psychometric functions were Wtted to the probability of perceiving V2 causal faster than V2 probe as a function of V2 probe levels. The point of subjective equality (PSE) indicated the overestimation of V2 causal , i.e. the speed level of V2 probe that was perceived as fast as V2 causal (probability equal to .5).
Moreover, to establish whether speed overestimation was related to the strength of the causal phenomenon, we asked subjects to rate perceived causality directly on a 1-to-5 scale, where 5 refers to the strongest impression of causality. In Experiment 1, we also asked subjects to discriminate between passive and active motion of S2. Ten naïve subjects and the two authors, all with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, participated.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs compared either PSEs or Ratings obtained with diVerent levels of V1 separately for triggering and launching (in Experiment 1) or with diVerent causal conWgurations (Experiments 2 and 3). Pairwise comparisons were made using t-test with Bonferroni correction.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we asked whether perceived V2 depended on V1, that is whether diVerent causality events were associated with diVerences in the perception of V2.
Method
In the test condition, observers compared V2 causal (40 ms interval) with V2 probe (1040 ms) and PSEs were measured for diVerent levels of V1 in both launching and triggering.
A control condition was also tested, in which a 1040 ms interval was used in both pairs so that neither produced perceptual causality. V1 was varied in independent blocks (.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16°/s) so that we had three conditions with V1 < V2 and three conditions with V1 > V2. Eight subjects participated, six naives and the two authors.
At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to rate causality to ensure that the conditions chosen were ideal for the perception of launching and triggering. They were also asked to observe twenty stimuli randomly presented, 10 with V1(8°/s) > V2 (3°/s) and ten with V1(1°/s) <V2 (3°/s) and judge whether the motion of the second mobile appeared active or passive.
Results and discussion
Discrimination of motion attribution produced 100% passive response when V1 > V2 and 94% active response when V1 < V2.
T-test revealed that mean perceived causality Ratings were higher for launching (4.92 § .01) than for triggering (4.3 § .1) and the diVerence was signiWcant (p < .005). Psychophysical functions obtained in the three test conditions with V1 > V2, producing impression of launching, are shown in Fig. 2a .
Data points are given by averaging PSEs of the eight subjects. Psychometric functions in these test conditions are largely displaced with respect to control, indicating a large overestimation of V2 in the causal pair (mean PSE D 3.90°/s), whereas there is no overestimation in the control condition (mean PSE D 3.06°/s), indicating that when no causality is perceived (mean rating D 1) no overestimation occurs. Most importantly, in these conditions, in which V1 > V2 and launching is perceived, overestimate of V2 increases in proportion to V1. Fig. 3a indeed shows that the ratio between V2 and V1 in the causal display is constant in the speed range 4-16°/s.
A one-way ANOVA with V1 as factor revealed that there is no diVerence between the V2 causal /V1 values obtained in the three V1 conditions [F 1,7 D 4.40, p > .05] . This suggests that V1 is considered the baseline stimulation, relative to which changes in V2 are evaluated and that overestimation of V2 follows Weber's law, an innate perceptual rule. Under this law, the larger a baseline stimulation (S) the larger the increment ( S) required for a change to be detectable: S/S D K.
The Wnding that, when V1 > V2 not only does causality display cause overestimation of V2 but overestimate is proportional to V1, suggests that observers do not perceive an absolute V2 but instead V2 plus a discriminable increment of V1. Thus, V2 is not assessed independently, rather it is perceived as a variation of V1. Fig. 2b shows the psychometric functions obtained when V1 < V2, a condition ideal for the triggering phenomenon. Also here, the psychometric functions in the test condition are displaced with respect to the control, indicating overestimation of V2 in the causal pair of the test (mean PSE D 3.58°/s).
However, in these conditions, where S1 is perceived as triggering the motion of S2, V2 causal /V1 decreases as V1 increases. Regression lines Wtted to the average values show an almost perfect linear Wt to the data (y D ¡0.47 + 1.62x, R 2 D l0.99) (although, for two subjects out of eight, a logarithmic function gave a better Wt). This indicates that V2 overestimate is constant across this speciWc V1 range (.5-2°/ s). This Wnding suggests that V2 overestimation is a consequence of V1, but is independent on its value. This could have, as phenomenal correlate, the perception of V2 as a kinetic property of the second object, still caused by V1. Since the relationship between V1 and V2 did not aVect perceived causality as such but the way S2 motion was perceived, either active (when V1 > V2) or passive (when V1 < V2), we suggest that whereas perceived causality is related to speed overestimation, the change in slope reXects the attribution of diVerent sources of V2 motion: either autonomous or belonging to V1.
The Wnding of speed overestimation in both launching and triggering indicates that overestimation is a general phenomenon and prompts the question of whether it is connected to causal perception, or else to the spatio-temporal continuity inherent in various displays. To address the point, in Experiments 2 and 3 we asked whether overestimation was reduced by manipulations that weaken perceived causality.
Experiment 2
The conditions used were those that aVect the impression of causation, as deWned by Michotte (1946 Michotte ( /1963 , and were all characterized by a variation of the ways in which the two objects interacted.
Method
Four stimulus conditions were tested. The relationship between V1 (8°/s) and V2 (3°/s) was ideal to perceive launching. The "launching" condition was as in Experiment 1. In the "succession" condition, S2 appeared on the screen only after S1 stopped. S1 moved 2.8° to the right and then stopped; after the pause, S2 appeared contiguously to the right of S1, and moved oV to the right for 2.8°, while S1 remained still. This stimulus produces the impression that S2 came out from S1, as though it had been hidden behind or within it. In the "overlap" condition, we produced a diVerent manipulation that should weaken perceived launching, maintaining the trajectory-to-trajectory alignment and varying the distance between the objects: S1 overlapped S2 as it ended its trajectory. In this condition, Michotte and, more recently, Scholl and Nakayama (2002) would not expect launching (or it should be much weaker). Indeed, this event produces the impression of a causal relation between the two moving objects -though without a genuine impression of "collision" between the objects, as always reported in a launching paradigm-or, in some cases, a "tunnel eVect". In the "gap" condition, there was a gap between the Wnal position of the Wrst object and the starting position of the second. The motion of S1 started 1°f urther to the left compared with the other conditions, and ended its trajectory after 2.8°, one degree away from S2. S2 then started to move right for 2.8°, S1 remaining still. This condition is described in the literature as a "launching at a distance" paradigm (Michotte, 1946 (Michotte, /1963 Yela, 1952) and produces the impression of a collision between the two objects, even if they do not contact, as if the second object were pushed by a force across an invisible medium.
Four naïve subjects participated, all but one (AP) new.
Results and discussion
The mean results are shown in Fig. 4 . PSEs were equal to 3.79, 3.32, 3.80 and 3.62 in "launching", "succession", "overlap" and "gap" conditions, respectively. The ANOVA revealed a weak overall eVect of stimulus [F 3,9 D 3.5, p < .06] and a signiWcant diVerence between "succession" and "causal" conditions (p < .01). Ratings were equal to 5 (launching), 3.3 (succession), 3.25 (overlap) and 4.25 (gap). The overall eVect of stimulus resulted signiWcant [F 3,9 D 4.48, p < .05], reXecting a signiWcant Rating diVerence between launching and succession (p < .05). It is seen that in "succession" overestimation is reduced together with perceived causality. This is the most powerful modiWcation that reduces perceived causality and speed overestimation together. Clearly, the presence of S2 static when S1 moves is fundamental for perceiving causality. The Rating results in the "overlap" condition are low because of an ambiguous "tunnel eVect" in some trials. In the "gap" condition, a causal relation is perceived and overestimation is high even without spatial contact between the two squares. This suggests that spatial contiguity between the two squares is not necessary for speed integration mechanisms.
Experiment 3
Since the manipulations produced in Experiment 2 did not fully abolish perceived causality, we are still unable to determine whether the speed overestimation is speciWc to the perception of causality, or it refers, in events not necessarily causal, to the perception of speeds that are presented in a temporally contiguous, non-delayed fashion. To distinguish between these two possibilities we tested a non-causal event that nevertheless leaded, as the causal event, to an integration of V1 and V2.
Method
Two conditions were tested. V1 was 8°/s and V2 was 3°/ s. In the "mirror motion" condition, S1 appeared on the right of the monitor and moved 2.8° toward the centre; it then stopped and S2 moved from the left 2.8° toward the centre, and stopped to the left of S1. From Michotte's work, causality should not be perceived in this condition. Indeed, observers describe these events as being independent, with no causal relation. As a causal control of the "mirror motion" condition we tested an "inverse launching" conWguration, in which the two motions were in opposite directions but not aligned since S2 was placed immediately below the stopping position of S1 [base-tobase distance D 0.5°]. When S1 reached the upper side of S2, it stopped and S2 moved oV to the left, while S1 remained still. Michotte and later Kanizsa (1991, pp. 187-224) used similar conditions. The event was described as expressing a causal relation between the two moving objects, i.e., between S1 stopping and S2 starting. Some of the participants had spontaneously qualiWed the movement of S2 as bouncing in a direction opposite to S1, as in a reXex action.
One new subject (DG) and three subjects used in Experiment 2 participated.
Results and discussion
The ANOVA revealed an overall eVect of stimulus for both PSEs [F 2,6 D 53.9, p < .003] and Rating diVerences [F( 2,6 ) D 25.6, p < .01]. Post hoc showed "mirror motion" diVered with respect to both "launching" and "inverse launching" in the PSEs (3.17 vs 3.7 and 3.76) as well as in the Ratings (1.5 vs 4.83 and 3.75). These results (Fig. 5) indicate that in "inverse launching" causality and overestimation were largely maintained when S2 moved in an opposite direction on a non-aligned trajectory. It appears that causality is perceived when a change in the direction of a continuous trajectory occurs -even although the central message of Michotte that the good continuity of the trajectory is important. Instead, in the "mirror motion" condition, where both directions and spatial order were inverted, causality and overestimation were almost abolished.
These diVerent results are obtained with two stimuli that create very similar conditions of speed integration. Indeed, the motion of S1 and S2 stimulate detectors tuned to the same speed and direction in both "mirror motion" and "inverse launching". This suggests that overestimation is only present when causality is perceived.
The Wnding that observers perceive overestimation and causality in the "inverse launching" but not in the "mirror motion" indicates that the crucial variable in perceiving causality (and overestimation) is the continuity at contact between the two motions.
Although the result of our experiments show that when causality is not perceived speed is not overestimated, one might still argue that speed overestimation might hold for spatio-temporally continuous motion trajectories, regardless of causality. However, according to Kanizsa (1991) , temporally and spatially continuous motion trajectories are always perceived as causal events and we have not been able to Wnd a counterexample to this rule.
General discussion
Despite the extensive investigation of mechanical launch and triggering both to uncover the psychophysical (see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000 for a review) and the neural bases of the phenomenon (Blakemore et al., 2003; Fonlupt, 2003; Schultz, Friston, O'Doherty, Wolpert, & Frith, 2005) , our demonstration that perceived causality is related to speed overestimation is a novel Wnding. Our results suggest that all changes that preserve continuity between the two motion vectors may aVect the qualitative impression of causality, which is nonetheless perceived, whereas changes that perceptually destroy the continuity between the two motion signals hamper perceived causality and speed overestimation together. Our Wndings therefore could apply to a broader range of causality phenomena than those resulting from a strict interpretation of good continuity, analogously to Michotte's theory of "ampliation of motion".
1
On the bases of these results we speculate that mechanical causality could have its roots in a speciWc kind of speed interaction resulting in an overestimation of V2, constant in triggering and proportional to V1 in launching. However, a deWnitive conclusion cannot be reached, simply because it seems impossible to distinguish sensitivity to changes in causality from sensitivity to changes in spatio-temporal variables that necessarily accompany the changes in causality. It simply seems not possible to avoid this confounding by Wnding a condition in which, despite motions are spatiotemporally continuous, causality is not perceived.
The core of our demonstration is that a simple psychophysical rule describes the speed overestimation eVect in causality. In launching, this overestimation of V2 is found to be proportional to V1, thus reXecting the tendency of the visual system to perceive the contrast of V1 as Wxed. Because of the visual system application of the Wxed contrast rule, V2 is perceived as non-autonomous and transmitted by S1, as per the pre-Galilean theory of impetus (Bozzi, 1990; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2002) . This speed illusion in launching is comparable to the famous "simultaneous contrast" illusion: a grey disk will appear increasingly lighter, up to 30%, when its surround is progressively darkened. Simultaneous contrast, as for the illusory overestimation of V2 in launching, arises simply from the visual system application of the Wxed contrast rule as described by Weber's law. In the case of perceived causality, Weber's law holds when V1 > V2, since speed overestimation is "caused" by the kinematics of S1 in proportion to its speed. We found that in triggering, in which V1 is low, the ratio rule fails since overestimation is constant and not dependent on V1. We suggest that to account for overestimation of V2 due to the presence of V1 but not directly dependent on it, the visual system interprets the overestimation as a violation of Newtonian laws of motion: S2 is perceived as moving autonomously, with access to a "hidden energy source" (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000 ; see also, in a diVerent context, Bingham, Schmidt, & Rosenblum, 1995) . So, we suggest that whereas speed overestimation results in perceived causality, the diVerent dependence of overestimation on V1, does not reXect diVerences in mechanisms, but instead it aVects the perceived "attribution" of the source of V2 overestimation: the source is either in the Wrst object, when overestimation is proportional to its speed, or it belongs to the second object, when its speed is constantly overestimated, regardless of V1. The demonstration of the dependency of perceived speed on Weber's law is highly signiWcant, given that this latter has universal application in explaining our sensations.
This speed integration mechanism seems to diVer from that underlying perception of "biological motion", which instead is the result of summing motion information over an extended temporal interval of up to 3 seconds (Neri, Morrone, & Burr, 1998) , because both perceived causality and overestimation instead depend on speed interaction occurring over a relatively short interval. The mechanism responsible for perceived overestimation is also diVerent from more complex motion mechanisms, such as that underlying recovery of 3D structure from motion (Ullman, 1979) , where the visual system has to assume that the object is rigid. Speed overestimation in perceived causality is independent of complex assumptions. Moreover, overestimation is an eVect opposite to that predicted if the underlying mechanism integrated local motion signals over a large area of visual Weld. Indeed, a vector sum (Wilson et al., 1992) would produce a change in the perceived direction of motion but would not predict a change in V2 speed. Motion averaging mechanisms, producing a global direction-independent motion estimate (Curran & Braddick, 2000; Khuu & Badcock, 2002; Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992) , would have caused an underestimation of V2 when V1 < V2. Instead, we found overestimation across the entire V1 range, suggesting that causality displays produce speciWc conditions of spatio-temporal interactions of local motions. This interaction is diVerent from averaging of speeds, which results with the perception of a mean speed, probably because averaging is performed over spatiallyinterspaced speeds, and generates a global speed percept. Interestingly, averaging does not alter the capability of segregating speed, whereas integration of successive and continuous motion signals in causal displays results in overestimation. Moreover, a co-operativity mechanism predicts that motion sensitivity depends on spatial factors. Other global motion percepts, such as the prediction of motion trajectories, are drastically hampered by manipulations of the spatially extended trajectory between two objects (Verghese & McKee, 2002 ). Instead we found, for example in "inverse-launching", the change in direction does not matter much, as long as trajectories are continuous.
Some psychophysical results on motion co-operativity seem related to ours. It has been shown that although discrimination of speed changes of a single trajectory is hard (Gottsdanker, 1956; MateeV et al., 2000; McKee & Nakayama, 1984; Snowden & Braddick, 1991) , and Weber fraction is several times higher than speed discrimination for spatially and temporally separated stimuli, this is only true when the two speed signals are part of a single trajectory, not when they are distinct entities (Verghese & McKee, 2006) . The reason why in "succession" and "mirror motion" conditions both perceived causality and speed overestimation reduce or disappear has to be found in the hampered continuity of motion in these conWgurations.
It appears that when continuity of successive motions is present, speed overestimation and perceived causality both occur. Conversely, in the absence of continuity neither of these two phenomena are present, suggesting that overestimation is speciWcally associated with causality although is not possible to demonstrate causation.
Another interesting issue is how the overestimation relates to contextual eVects. It has been shown that causality can be perceived with multi-element displays (White, 2005) and that ambiguous launch becomes unambiguous either when temporally synchronized to a canonical launch event (Scholl & Nakayama, 2002) , or when perceptually grouped with an additional object (Choi & Scholl, 2004) . Our suggestion that overestimation reXects a speed diVerentiation diYculty due to speed integration is not incompatible with context eVects, since speed integration has been shown to occur with multi-element displays (Curran & Braddick, 2000; van Doorn & Koenderink, 1984; Khuu & Badcock, 2002; Snowden & Braddick, 1989; Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992; Wilson et al., 1992) .
Finally, more complex interactions have been reported. For example, Guski and Troje (2003) showed that causality judgments increased when additional auditory or visual information marked the onset of the target motion. This implies that a motion integration mechanism in vision may interact with mechanisms in other modalities, as some data suggest (Sekuler, Sekuler, & Lau, 1997) .
In conclusion, our results fully support Michotte's intuition that simple spatio-temporal rules provide the foundation of mechanical causality and triggering, and that the key factors for causal attribution are simple but highly speciWc and stimulus-driven kinematic structures. It is interesting to speculate whether other causal structures between pairs of moving objects (chasing, reaction, avoidance) can be contemplated in the framework of this speciWc speed integration.
